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Indonesia's New Block Grant Transfer: 
Its Equalization Performance and Remaining Challenges* 
Norio Usui 
A key principle in successful fiscal decentralization is to guaran-
tee a reasonable balance between expenditure needs and revenue 
capacities at lower levels of government. This paper reviews the 
allocation methods of Indonesia's new block grant ransfer scheme, 
a mainstay of intergovernmental fiscal relations after decentraliza-
tion, and assesses its equalization performance by conducting sim-
pie simulation exercises. Before al else, equalization function of 
the block grant needs to be more clearly defined. Major challenges 
raised are: 1) conceptual and design weaknesses of fiscal capacity 
and expenditure needs specifications in the allocation formula; 2) 
unequalizing effects of non-formula allocations, in particular bal-
ancing factor allocations; 3) inappropriate sharing arrangement 
between provinces and local governments; and 4) prohibition of 
non-negative transfers. 
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1. Introduction 
After a long period of centralized authoritarian rule, Indonesia initiated a 
drastic decentralization program in fiscal year (FY) 2001. Although various 
efforts were made to empower regional governments1 even before the 
decentralization, political difficulties in maintaining national unity after the 
1997 economic crisis created a strong and urgent need to decentralize the 
country for the first time in Indonesia. The hierarchical relationship be-
* This paper updates analyses of Indonesia's block grant allocation methods in my previous papers, 
Usui (2003a) and Usui (2003b), based on new information and recent developments. The author 
would like to thank Professor M. G. Asher (National University of Singapore), Dr. B. Bikales (Asian 
Development Bank), Professor S. Hondai (Kobe University), and Professor K. Hashimoto (Kansai 
University) for their comments on earlier drafts. Discussions with Dr. B. D. Lewis (Research Triangle 
lnstitute/MOF advisor) are deeply appreciated. A part of this study was financed by the Kansai 
University Grant-in-Aid for the Faculty Joint Research Program 2003. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 In this paper, the term "regional government" encompasses both provincial and local govern-
ments, while "local government" refers to Kota and Kabupaten. 
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?tween provincial and local governments called Kota (municipality or city) 
and Kabupaten (regency or district) was eliminated, and al local govern-
ments became fully autonomous and responsible for planning, manage-
ment, financing, and major public service deliveries. While provincial 
governments also act as autonomous regions, they retain a hierarchical 
relationship with the central government. At the same time, about two mil-
lion central civil servants, who worked at regional offices of central line 
ministries, were transferred administratively to regional governments. 
In discussing decentralization in developing countries, we confront a 
basic question about the relationship be切eendecentralization and eco-
nomic growth. Some emphasize that decentralization can lead to macro-
economic instability, which can inhibit economic growth, and others argue 
that, in developing countries, decentralization can not reap its benefits due 
to institutional and human resource constraints. We insist, however, that 
decentralization increases economic efficiency in public spending and, that 
it can therefore be growth enhancing. There are well established imple-
mentation principles which can help to realize decentralization in a way 
which is linked to efficiency and which enhances growth: 1) expenditures 
should follow capacities; 2) revenues should follow expenditures; and 3) 
decentralization should be deficit-neutral. 
Although Indonesia's decentralization is deeply rooted in the specific 
political motivation, a key objective is to increase economic efficiency by 
utilizing the information advantages of lower levels of government in pub-
lic spending. Intergovernmental fiscal relations should be established to 
guarantee a reasonable balance between expenditure responsibilities and 
revenue instruments available to regional governments. A basic principle is 
that expenditure responsibilities should come first, and revenue responsi-
bilities should be assigned next. Without a careful assessment of fiscal 
needs to finance newly devolved expenditure responsibilities, it is not pos-
sible to efficiently determine revenue assignments to regional govern-
ments. However, in reality, Indonesia's decentralization started without 
clear expenditure assignments. Although the Government of Indonesia (the 
Government) listed newly devolved functions of regional governments2, 
2 Decentralization laws and regulations define roles of regional governments only in general terms: 
local governments take primary responsibilities for public works, health, education, agriculture, 
communication, industry and trade, investment, environment, land matters, cooperatives, and 
human resources, while provincial governments play coordinating roles. 
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there is stil considerable confusion on about how authority between the 
different levels of government should be demarcated. Accordingly, obliga-
tory functions for local governments and their minimum service standards 
have not yet been established. 
Compared with the vague expenditure assignments, the Government 
has prepared relatively clear revenue assignments. Before FY2001, there 
existed two transfers from the center to regions: (i) Subsidy to Regions 
(SDO), which was mainly used to finance salaries of regional civil servants; 
and (i) Regional Development Funds (INPRES) for regional development 
activities. Since FY2001, both transfers have been eliminated and instead 
combined into the General Allocation Fund (DAU), a block grant. Indonesia 
also expanded the revenue sharing system to assign each regional govern-
ment its share of revenues from taxes on personal income, land and build-
ing, transfer of lands and buildings, forestry, mining, fisheries, oil, and 
natural gas. Another newly introduced transfer was the Special Allocation 
Table 1 Central Budgets and Transfers to Regions 
(Rp. trillion) 一AfterDecentralization 
FY2000 # (% of GDP) FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 (% of GDP) 
Revenues 203.9 16.8 263.2 301.9 336.2 17.3 
Expenditures 262.7 21.6 315.8 344.0 370.6 19.1 
Central Government 218.0 18.0 234.1 246.0 253.7 13.1 
Routine 183.1 15.1 190.2 193.7 188.6 9.7 
Development 34.9 2.9 44.0 52.3 65.1 3.4 
Transfers to Regions 44.7 3.7 81.7 98.0 116.9 6.0 
Balanced Funds 44.7 3.7 81.7 94.5 107.5 5.5 
Revenue Sharing 3.5 0.3 20.3 24.6 27.9 1.4 
Personal Income Tax 3.1 4.1 5.3 0.3 
Property-related Taxes n.a. n.a. 5.4 7.9 9.6 0.4 
Natural Resources n.a. n.a. 11.7 12.7 13.0 0.7 
DAU## 41.2 3.4 60.5 69.1 77.0 4.0 
OAK 0.9 0.8 2.6 0.1 
Special Autonomy & Balancing Funds 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 9.4 0.5 
Special Autonomy ### 1.4 1.5 0.1 
Contingency/Hold Harmless 2.8 2.1 2.3 0.2 
Others 5.6 0.3 
Primary Balance 14.0 1.2 24.0 46.4 47.5 2.5 
Overall Balance -58.8 -4.8 -52.6 -42.1 -34.4 —1.8 
Notes: # annualized. # SDO plus INPRES for FY2000. ### Additional DAU to Papua for its special autonomy. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
?Fund (DAK), a matching or earmarked grant, which aimed to impose 
national priorities at~egional level and/or financing projects which have 
spil over effects across regions. Further, the regional tax and levy law was 
revised to strengthen regions'revenue mobilizing capacities. 
After the decentralization, the total amount of central transfers (DAU, 
revenue sharing, DAK, and other transfers) was drastically increased (Table 
1). The amounts for FY2001, FY2002, and FY2003 were Rp. 81.7 trillion, Rp. 
98.0 trilion, and Rp. 116.9 trilion, or 5.7, 5.8, and 6.0 percent of GDP, 
respectively, much higher than the Rp. 33.5 trillion or 3.7 percent of GDP 
for FY2000. DAU has taken up about 70 percent of total transfers. Regional 
budgets also show that DAU is the most important revenue source for 
regional governments. In FY2001, DAU allocation accounted for 67.9 per-
cent of total local government revenues. Even at the provincial level, which 
acquired higher revenue mobilization capacity due to the new regional tax 
assignments, it takes up more than 20 percent (Table 2). All this indicates 
that DAU has become a mainstay of the new intergovernmental transfers 
in decentralized Indonesia. 
Table 2 Regional Budgets 
FY20QQ# FY2001 
Provinces Local Governments Provinces Local Governments 
(Rp. bil.) (%) (Rp. bil.) (%) (Rp. bil.) (%) (Rp. bil.) (%) 
Revenues 12,984 100.0 39,654 100.0 29,396 100.0 79,459 100.0 
Previous Year's Surplus 1,179 9.1 1,752 4.4 4,067 13.8 2,151 2.7 
Region's Own Revenues 3,953 30.4 3,596 9.1 10,134 34.5 5,225 6.6 
Balanced Funds 7,820 60.2 33,299 84.0 14,159 48.2 68,816 86.6 
Tax Sharing 706 5.4 3,739 9.4 4,290 14.6 5,718 7.2 
Non-Tax Sharing 996 7.7 714 1.8 3,206 10.9 8,266 10.4 
匹絆 6,114 47.1 28,379 71.6 6,507 22.1 53,992 四
OAK### 3 0.0 467 1.2 156 0.5 839 1.1 
Local Borrowing 32 0.2 1,008 2.5 11 0.0 484 0.6 
Others ゜0.0 ゜0.0 1,025 3.5 2,783 3.5 Expenditures 11,635 100.0 37,689 100.0 23,093 100.0 69,623 100.0 
Routine Expenditure 5,934 51.0 25,147 66.7 14,699 63.7 48,255 69.3 
Personnel Expenditure 2,042 17.6 18,521 49.1 5,763 25.0 35,289 50.7 
Non-Personnel Expenditure 3,892 33.4 6,626 17.6 8,936 38.7 12,966 18.6 
Development Expenditure 5,701 49.0 12,543 33.3 8,394 36.3 21,368 30.7 
Balances (% to total revenues) 1,349 10.4 1,965 5.0 6,303 21.4 9,836 12.4 
Notes: # annualized. ## SDO plus INPRES for FY2000. ### Specific purpose INPRES for FY2000. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
?This paper analyzes Indonesia's block grant (DAU) allocation methods 
in the first three years after the decentralization. The DAU allocation 
scheme has been undergoing almost annual revisions, and each of these 
revisions has brought new problems in its wake. It is very important to 
review these past experiences at this stage in order to clarify major con-
straints and to establish clear policy directions for Indonesia progress. This 
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews DAU allocation methods in 
the past three years; Section 3 assesses the equalization performance of 
the current DAU allocation method by conducting simple simulation exer-
cises. The final section summarizes major conclusions. 
2. DAU Allocation Methods: Review 
The total DAU amount in the central budget is set at a minimum 25 percent 
of the central government's domestic revenues. This amount is shared 
between provincial and local governments at a rate of 10 percent and 90 
percent, respectively. Reflecting its difficult fiscal condition, the Government 
has allocated the minimum, 25 percent, of its domestic revenues in the 
past three yea rs包Inaddition, the central budget contains other transfers to 
take into account: 1) special autonomy for Papua province (two percent of 
total DAU since FY2002); 2) hold harmless (since FY2002), which is dis-
cussed in the later part of this paper; and 3) contingency (FY2001 and 
FY2003)4. 
DAU is defined as an equalization grant to regions. However, it is very 
important to define the concept of "equalization" before analyzing the 
equalization effect of DAU. Some define it as equalization of per capita rev-
enues, while others consider it to be an equalization of per capita transfers. 
There seems to be confusion about the concept of equalization amongst 
policy makers and researchers. However, it must be noted that government 
regulation No. 104/2000 clearly stipulates that the general allocation fund 
shall be allocated with the purpose of equalizing the financial capacity 
among regions to finance spending required to implement decentralization 
scheme, which means that a key objective of DAU is to equalize fiscal 
3 According to the GTZ decentralization newsletter (No. 51), the Government has agreed with the par-
liament (DPR) to raise the percentage of DAU to 26 percent from FY2004. 
4 It is to be noted that these funds are recorded outside the DAU budget and categorized as special 
autonomy and balancing funds in the central budget. 
?capacities across regions to finance their expenditure needs. To this end, 
the Government has set out a "fiscal gap" formula for DAU allocation. 
However, the Government hesitated to distribute al DAU based on this for-
mula, and instead made some adjustments to actual DAU allocations. DAU 
allocation to a regional government i isbased on three factors: 
DAUi = BFAi + FFAi + LSFAi 
where BFA is balancing factor allocation, FFA is formula factor allocation, 
and LSFA is lump-sum factor allocation (Table 3). 
Table 3 Allocation Weights by Factors 
FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 
Provinces Local Govts Provinces Local Govts Provinces Local Govts 
DAU (Rp. trilion) 6.1 54.5 6.9 62.2 7.7 69.3 
Balancing Factor (%) 80.0 80.9 30.0 50.0 30.0 45.0 
Formula Factor (%) 20.0 18.5 50.0 40.0 60.0 50.0 
Lump-Sum Factor (%) 0.0 0.6 20.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 
Sub-Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Contingency/Hold Harmless 
・1.2 1.6 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.1 (Rp. trilion) 
Total (Rp. trilion) 7.3 56.1 8.1 63.1 8.9 70.4 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
Further, additional transfers have been distributed in the past three 
years. In FY2001, the first year of decentralization, the Government allo-
cated a total of Rp. 2.8 trillion (Rp. 1.2 trillion to provinces, and Rp. 1.6 
trilion to local governments) as contingency funds to accommodate additional 
salary costs in the regions due to the centrally-initiated retroactive salary 
increase. Since FY2002, the Government has prepared another fund, which 
is included in special autonomy and balancing funds in the central budget, 
for hold harmless allocation, which we discuss in the next section. Ap-
pendix table summarizes DAU allocation procedures in the past three 
years. 
2.1. Formula Factor Allocation: 
The formula factor allocation aims at allocating DAU based on the fiscal 
gaps (FG) of regional governments. Total amounts of DAU allocated to this 
?factor are distributed to regions according to their relative fiscal gaps. The 
fiscal gap is defined as the difference between expenditure needs (EN) and 
fiscal capacity (FC). 
FG戸 ENi-FCi
Under this definition, fiscal gaps in some regions, in particular those that 
have high revenue capacities, can be negative, which, in theory, implies 
negative DAU allocations to such regions. However, under the current sys-
tern, a negative DAU allocation is not permitted, so the fiscal gaps for such 
regions are set at zero. 
Expenditure needs in the FY2001 formula were defined as a product of 
average regional government expenditure and the fiscal needs index: 
EN・-------~ 1 Popi = 0 _ ( + Area, + Povhead; + Cost, 
4巧 /n 砂叫n 巧 head,jn 砂Cost,/n)
where APBDEXPr is total regional government expenditures (past actual 
data was utilized), Pop is the population, Area is surface area, Povhead is the 
head account poverty index (percentage of people below the poverty line), 
Cost is a cost index, n is the number of regional governments, T indicates 
the total of the variables. 
A fatal weakness of this specification is its treatment of average fiscal 
needs. Under this definition, the Government assumed that aggregate fis-
cal need after decentralization was equal to actual regional governments' 
expenditures before decentralization, since actual expenditure data before 
decentralization was utilized. We also note that the Government gave each 
variable equal weight (1/4). However, there was no empirical assessment of 
the validity of this as a measure of regions'fiscal needs, nor was itpossible 
for the Government to judge the appropriateness of this assessment, since 
fiscal needs could not be evaluated without clear expenditure assignments 
and their cost estimations. 
Another problem lies in the treatment of the cost index. This is intended 
to measure regional differences in public service delivery costs, which are 
assumed to be positively related to expenditure needs. Because costs differ 
greatly between regions, it is important to incorporate a measure of this 
cost deferential. However, in general, the cost index should be structured to 
?adjust the fiscal needs differential after considering other factors, i.e., popu-
lation, area, and poverty. In the above formula, the cost index influences 
fiscal needs after its effect has been averaged with other three other vari-
ables. 
For FY2002, the Government slightly revised the definition of expendi-
ture needs and adopted different weights for the variables. These changes 
were also incorporated for FY2003. However, it is stil difficult to evaluate 
the impacts of this change on improving the measurement of regions'true 
fiscal needs without knowing true expenditure assignments and their cost 
implications. There is no convincing explanation by the Government for 
this change. 
APBDEXPr (Pap, Area; P 
ENi =• 0.4• + 0.1• 
I 
+0.1• ovgapi +04• Cosli n'fP1JJ1,jn prea. n 幻Pavgap,jn・fCost;/n) 
The poverty index is another issue. In the FY2002 formula, the head 
account poverty index (Pov加ad)of the FY2001 formula, was replaced by 
the poverty gap index (Povgap), which is measured by the average propor-
tionate distance of the poor from the poverty line. The poverty gap index 
intends to capture the depth of poverty. However, it is not clear which 
index is a better measure of the fiscal needs of regional governments for 
poverty alleviation. Further, we may need to consider whether any poverty 
related index needs to be included in the assessment of expenditure needs. 
As mentioned, a clear demarcation of authority between different levels of 
government has not yet been well established in Indonesia. If primary 
responsibility for poverty alleviation falls on the central government, there 
is no need for any poverty index to be included in the formula. These 
issues need to be carefully reviewed for future revisions. 
Fiscal capacity in FY2001 was defined as the average sum of regional 
own revenues (PAD), shared revenues from land and building tax (PBB) 
and lands and buildings transfer tax (BPHTB) times the fiscal capacity 
index: 
FC戸 (PADr+ PBBr + BPH'I'Br)• _l (NRO,IGRDP, NNRO,IGRDP, LF,!Pop, ＋ 
n 3 NROr!GRDPr NNROr!GRDPr + LFr!Popr) 
where NRO is natural resource sector GDP, NNRO is non-natural resource 
，?
sector GDP, GRDP is regional GDP, and LF isworking age population. 
There are some conceptual problems with this formulation. First, it is 
not clear why the Government did not incorporate shared revenues from 
personal income tax and natural resources. Neglecting these revenues 
implies that the fiscal capacities of some regions with broad tax bases 
and/or abundant natural resources will inevitably be underestimated, and 
will therefore attract larger DAU allocations. A possible explanation for this 
may be that these shared revenue data were not available when the 
Government established the formula. Second, there is no specific reason to 
employ both natural resource sector GDP and non-natural resource sector 
GDP in the definition, since the sum of the two variables must be equal to 
the total regional GDP. Third, it is not consistent to use the working age 
population as a variable to measure fiscal capacity, since the labor force 
can be regarded as a factor of production, i.e., regional GDP, which has 
already been incorporated into the definition. 
In FY2002, the fiscal capacity definition was simplified and much im-
proved. Fiscal capacity is the sum of a region's own and shared revenues: 
FCi=Pゆ i+ PBBi + BPHTBi + PPHi + 0.75• SDAi 
where PAD is a region's potential own revenues, PPH is shared personal 
income tax revenue, and SDA is shared natural resources revenues. 
Since the region's potential own revenue is measured as a function of 
manufacturing and service sector GDP (GRDPMS), this revision can provide 
a tax mobilizing incentive to regional governments. This is one of the sig-
nificant improvements in the FY2002 formula. 
Pゆ i= /3o+ /31• GRDPMSけ＆
However, we note that, despite the improvements, the FY2002 fiscal capac-
ity definition has another serious problem. According to this definition, only 
75 percent of shared revenues from natural resources can be included in 
fiscal capacity. Considering the significant counter-equalizing effect of nat-
ural resource revenue sharing, al (100 percent) of shared natural resource 
revenue should have been regarded as increasing a region's fiscal capacity. 
However, a lower 75 percent weighting was introduced after strong lobby-
ing by some regional governments, in particular some from resource rich 
10 
regions. 
As in FY2002, the Government utilized the region's potential own rev-
enues (P. 紅） as a component of fiscal capacity calculation for FY2003 DAU 
allocation. However, only half of the potential revenues were incorporated 
into the actual calculation. As mentioned, there was no need to consider 
any disincentive to regional governments'tax mobilization efforts since, as 
a matter of fact, the Government has utilized estimated potential revenues 
since FY2002. The Government might consider that the simple regression 
method could not capture regional governments'potential revenue capaci-
ties accurately. If that is the case, they would be well advised to use actual 
regional own revenue data, and some portion, say, in this case 50 percent, 
of the actual regional own revenues as a component of regional govern-
ments'fiscal capacity calculation. 
FCi=0.5•P.. ゆ i+ PBBi + BPHTBi + PPHi + 0.75• SDAi 
We note that, in the past three years, the fiscal gap formula has been 
applied only to the residuals of DAU: the Government first determined allo-
cation amounts for balancing and lump-sum factor allocations, which are 
discussed in the following parts, and the remaining amounts were dis-
tributed based on the formula. In FY2001, the shares of formula factor allo-
cations, both for provinces and local governments, made up only about 
20 percent of total DAU allocation amounts. Although higher shares of 
DAU have been based on the formula in FY2002 and FY2003, its shares 
remained at 60 percent (provinces) and 50 percent (local governments) 
even in FY2003. 
2.2. Balancing Factor Allocation 
In FY2000, when the DAU allocation method for FY2001 was discussed 
within the Government, there was serious concern over possible mis-
matches between expenditure responsibilities and revenue assignments 
in regional budgets. Of particular relevance was one of the most serous 
concerns, relating to uncertainty about additional salary costs due to the 
large-scale central staff transfer, which was to be financed by the regions 
after decentralization. As mentioned, about two million civil servants were 
scheduled to be transferred to regional governments. However, at this 
stage, the Government did not have any reliable data regarding the staff to 
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be transferred to each regional government. To address the issue, the 
Government decided on one measure for local governments and another 
for provinces. For local governments, the Government first decided to allo-
cate 30 percent of SDO and 10 percent of INPRES in addition to the annual-
ized total amount of SDO and INPRES allocated in FY2000 to each local 
government. The Government assumed that the additional salary costs 
could be financed by the 30 percent increase in SDO and the 10 percent 
increase in INPRES. The total amount of the balancing factor allocation 
made up as much as 80 percent of the total DAU available to local govern-
ments (DAU叫 inFY2001. 
BFA戸 1.3•SDOi + 1.1• INPRES1 
This measure could not be applied to provincial governments since the 
total amounts of SDO and INPRES received by provinces in FY2000 were 
greater than the total DAU available to provinces (10 percent of total DAU) 
in FY2001. The Government utilized the total amounts of SDO and INPRES, 
without the additional 30 percent of SDO and 10 percent of INPRES, to 
determine the balancing factor amounts to provinces. Following the alloca-
tion to local governments (about 80 percent for the balancing factor alloca-
tion), 80 percent of DAU available to provinces (DAUTP) was distributed as 
the balancing factor allocation: 
BFA,=( 
SDO, + INPRES,) 
i (SDOi + INPRESi) •0.8•DAU TP 
1、
In FY2002, the Government adopted wage bil for civil servants, in place 
of SDO and INPRES, to incorporate salary costs of regional governments 
explicitly, and allocated 30 percent (provinces) and 50 percent (local gov-
ernments) of the total DAU amounts as the balancing factor allocations. 
The balancing factor allocations covered about 77 percent and 31 percent 
of total salary costs of provinces and local governments, respectively. In 
FY2003, while its share was slightly reduced to 45 percent for local govern-
ments, the same share (30 percent) was distributed as this factor for 
provinces. However, as we analyze in the next section, balancing factor 
allocations have significantly undermined the equalizing effect of DAU. 
Further, we note that the wage and salary-based balancing factor alloca-
12 
tions since FY2002 may encourage one particular moral hazard. In order to 
successfully integrate the large numbers of formerly centralized civil ser-
vants, it is essential that regional governments strive to implement efficient 
management and restructuring. One disincentive to this process may be 
the fact that larger personnel expenses without any effort towards greater 
efficiency will attract higher DAU allocations to such regions. 
2.3. Lump-Sum Factor Allocation 
In FY2001, after the Government calculated the DAU allocation to each 
region based on the draft central budget, that budget was revised following 
parliamentary debate. The lump-sum factor allocation was introduced to 
equalize distribution of the increased amount of DAU following the revi-
s1on. 
However, in FY2002, the Government retained the lump-sum alloca-
tions both for provinces and local governments: 20 percent of DAUTP 
(provinces) and 10 percent of DAUTL (local governments) were distributed 
equally. It was not clear why the Government retained this component for 
FY2002, since the lump-sum factor was introduced just to reallocate the 
increased amount of DAU due to the budget revision in FY2001. It is clearly 
evident that the lump-sum allocations could serve as an incentive to create 
new local governments, and in fact, 12 new local governments were estab-
lished in FY2001 and 22 in FY2002. To address this criticism, the FY2003 
DAU allocation proposal prepared by the university consortium, recom-
mends the abolition of this component. However, the Government ulti-
mately decided to retain it, although its allocation shares were dropped to 
10 percent (provinces) and 5 percent (local governments). 
2.4. Hold Harmless Allocation: Political Intervention 
In FY2001, when the Government submitted the FY2002 DAU allocation 
proposal, the parliament requested a revision of DAU allocation to guaran-
tee that no regional government could receive less DAU than in FY2001. 
After strong political pressure, the Government revised the allocation by 
reallocating a part of DAU from surplus regions, where proposed amounts 
for FY2002 were larger than FY2001 allocations, to deficit regions, and by 
allocating an additional Rp. 2.1 trillion from its budget to accommodate the 
parliament's request. This is the origin of the so-called hold harmless allo-
cation. 
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We note that the hold harmless component was very different from the 
balancing factor allocation described in the earlier part of this paper. It 
reflects strong lobbying activities by some resource rich regions who 
might have lost out under the original proposal. Some believed that the 
hold harmless component could be justified by government regulation 
No.104/2000, which states that "the proposal of the Regional Autonomy 
Advisory Council (DPOD) shall take the balancing factor into account". 
However, in principle, this regulation was prepared to make it possible for 
the Government to allocate a part of DAU on non-formula basis to avoid 
possible mismatches between expenditure responsibilities and revenue 
assignments in regions. As discussed, on this principle, a part of DAU was 
allocated as the balancing factor allocations in FY2001 (based on past SDO 
and INPRES) and FY2002 (based on civil servant salaries). In FY2003, the 
hold harmless component was retained. After reallocating a part of DAU 
from surplus local governments (Rp. 1.2 trilion) to deficit regions, an addi-
tional Rp. 1.1 trillion was distributed from the central budget. For provinces, 
an additional Rp. 1.2 trillion was financed by the central budget without any 
reallocation among provinces. 
3. Equalization Performance: Simulation Exercises 
This section analyzes the equalization performance of the current (FY2003) 
DAU allocation method. The equalization effect of DAU can be assessed by 
comparing fiscal indicators among regional governments before and after 
DAU allocation. However, two issues need to be clarified before our analy-
sis. First, we have to select the most appropriate fiscal indicator for as-
sessing the equalization performance of DAU. This means that we need to 
establish a clear concept of "equalization". There are various concepts of 
equalization such as per capita revenues and per capita transfers etc., and 
our conclusion depends on the definition we employ for our analysis. 
There are some researches on the equalization performance of DAU. 
Reflecting the lack of a common understanding of the concept of equaliza-
tion, some use per capita revenues, while others use different indicators as 
a target indicator to measure equalization performance. Even among policy 
makers, it seems that there is no clear consensus on the concept of equal-
ization. However, as we have mentioned, Indonesia's laws and regulations 
clearly define that a key objective of DAU allocation is to equalize the fiscal 
- --~ 
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capacities of regional governments to finance their expenditure needs. This 
implies the equalization of neither per capita revenues nor per capita trans-
fers, but the equalization of fiscal capacities to fiscal needs. We therefore 
need to evaluate its equalization performance by analyzing how well re-
gional governments'fiscal capacities can fulfil their expenditure needs 
after allocation of DAU. 
Next, we need to establish proper measures of fiscal needs and fiscal 
capacity. However, as discussed in the preceding section, various weak-
nesses are found both in the fiscal capacity and expenditure needs defini-
tions utilized in the current formula. In this analysis, we define a regional 
government fiscal capacity (FCりas:
FCi*=P切 i+ PBBi + BPHTBけ PPHi+ SDAi + DAUi 
This specification means that 100 percent of the potential region's own rev-
enues (PAf)) and shared revenues from natural resource sectors (SDA) are 
taken into account as components of regions'fiscal capacities. We note 
that, in the current DAU allocation formula, only 50 percent and 75 percent 
of both revenues are incorporated into the fiscal capacity calculations. 
Expenditure needs assessment is much more problematic. As mentioned, 
there are some serious flaws in the current expenditure needs formulation. 
We recommend strongly that the Government set up a more appropriate 
expenditure needs indicator. However, in the current situation, no indicator 
can capture the true expenditure needs of regional governments, since 
there is no clear demarcation of authority between the different levels of 
government. For that matter, cost estimations of the new expenditure 
responsibilities are only possible after decentralization. We thus use the 
current expenditure needs formulation developed by the Government, 
bearing in mind its shortcomings. 
To analyze the equalization performance of the current DAU allocation 
method, we first calculate the ratio of expenditure needs to cumulative 
regional government's revenue for al provinces and local governments 
(Table 4). The cumulative regional government's revenue is defined as 
cumulative revenues, which begins with the region's potential own rev-
enues (P. 紅） and adds shared revenues from personal income tax (PPH), 
land andbuilding tax (PBB), land and building transfer tax (BPHTB), and 
natural resources (SDA), and DAU. Changes in the coefficient of variation 
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Table 4 Variations of Expenditure Needs (EN) to Cumulative Revenue Ratios 
Sharing Revenues 
PAD +PPH +PBB +BPHTB +SDA +DAU FY2003 
Provinces 
Maximum 22.57 21.01 18.40 18.27 17.77 1.73 
Minimum 0.25 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 
Max/Min 89.2 154.3 160.2 183.8 181.9 20.1 
Average 6.11 5.39 4.57 4.51 3.85 1.04 
Standard Deviation 5.74 5.18 4.26 4.24 4.00 0.41 
Coef. of Variation 0.940 0.960 0.932 0.939 1.039 0.394 
Local Governments 
Maximum 67.38 42.50 21.28 19.45 17.75 1.48 
Minimum 2.05 1.70 1.27 1.03 0.23 0.18 
Max/Min 32.8 25.1 16.8 18.8 76.3 8.0 
Average 18.06 15.18 9.17 8.38 6.57 0.86 
Standard Deviation 8.47 6.90 3.35 3.11 3.30 0.17 
Coef. of Variation 0.469 0.454 0.365 0.371 0.503 0.199 
show the equalization effect of newly added transfers. The results indicate 
that the DAU allocations have a significant equalizing effect: after the DAU 
allocations, coefficients of variation of both provinces and local govern-
ments drop significantly from their levels before the DAU allocations have 
been made. 
However, if we check the ratio of expenditure needs to fiscal capacities 
(FCり，whichcorrespond to the ratio after DAU allocations, there stil remain 
very large differences in the ratio both within provinces and local govern-
Figure 1 Histogram of Expenditure Needs (EN) to Fiscal Capacity (FC*) Ratios: 
FV2003 DAU Allocations 
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ments. For provinces, the highest ratio is about 20 times larger than the 
lowest, and for local governments, the highest is eight times larger than 
the lowest. Further, the results show that some regions can not finance 
their expenditure needs even after the DAU allocations are made, while 
other regions enjoy more than enough revenues to finance their expendi-
ture needs. Figure 1 shows the histogram of expenditure needs to fiscal 
capacity ratios. It indicates that in 60 percent of provinces (18 out of a total 
30 provinces) and 17 percent of local governments (59 out of a total 348 
local governments), their revenue capacities are less than their expenditure 
needs. This implies that further assessment of the current DAU allocation 
method is required to improve the equalization performance of DAU. 
To clarify the weaknesses of the current DAU allocation method, we 
conduct simple simulation exercises互Wesummarize the assumptions 
employed in Table 5. The DAU allocation for FY2003 is set as the baseline. 
In the first case (Case 1), the hold harmless allocation is dropped, which 
means that DAU is distributed according to three factors, namely lump-
sum factor, balancing factor, and formula factor. The simulation result of 
this scenario and a comparison with the baseline case enables us to evalu-
ate the impact of the hold harmless allocation on the equalization perfor-
mance of DAU. In Case 2, we further drop the lump-sum allocation and 
assume that the amount formerly allocated as lump-sum allocation is dis-
tributed according to the formula factor. Finally, in Case 3, we drop the bal-
ancing factor allocation and assume that al DAU is allocated based on the 
formula. 
The results confirm that the hold harmless, lump-sum, and balancing 
factor allocations have undermined the equalization effect of DAU both for 
provinces and local governments. In particular, the unequalizing effect of 
the balancing factor allocation is much more significant than that of the 
other two factors. Without these allocations, which means a 100 percent 
formula based allocation, regional fiscal capacities to finance expenditure 
needs can be equalized to a much greater extent (Table 6). Thus, there is 
stil a long way to go before the expected equalization effect of DAU is real-
ized. 
With the solely formula based allocation, the fiscal capacities of al local 
5 All data utilized in the simulation exercises are available from the website of Directorate General of 
Central and Local Fiscal Balance, Ministry of Finance (www.djpkpd.go.id). 
Table 5 Assumptions for Simulation Exercises 
Baseline (FY2003) 
Prov. Local Govt. 
Balancing Factor(%) 30.0 45.0 
Formula Factor (%) 60.0 50.0 
Lump-Sum Factor(%) 10.0 5.0 
Hold Harmless yes yes 
Case 1 
Prov. Local Govt. 
30.0 45.0 
60.0 50.0 
10.0 5.0 
no no 
Case 2 
Prov. Local Govt. 
30.0 45.0 
70.0 55.0 
0.0 0.0 
no no 
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Case 3 
Prov. Local Govt. 
0.0 0.0 
100.0 100.0 
0.0 0.0 
no no 
Table 6 Variations of Expenditure Needs (EN) to Fiscal Capacity (FC*) Ratios 
Baseline (FY2003) Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Provinces 
Maximum 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.28 
Minimum 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 
Max/Min 20.1 20.0 19.9 13.1 
Average 1.04 1.06 1.06 0.95 
Standard Deviation 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.30 
Coef. of Variation 0.394 0.376 0.373 0.311 
Local Governments 
Maximum 1.48 1.44 1.40 0.87 
Minimum 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.23 
Max/Min 8.0 7.0 6.8 3.8 
Average 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.84 
Standard Deviation 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.07 
Coef. of Variation 0.199 0.178 0.177 0.078 
governments become greater than their expenditure needs. In contrast, in 
case of 18 provinces whose fiscal capacities are less than their expenditure 
needs under the current DAU allocation method, their expenditure needs to 
fiscal capacity ratios still remain less than one, even with the solely formula 
based allocation (Table 7)6. On average, the ratios for provinces are higher 
6 In FY2001, provincial governments carried over more than Rp. 6 trillion in savings to the next fiscal 
year (Table 2), which may imply that provinces enjoyed more than enough financial resources to 
meet their expenditure needs. However, there are some issues we have to consider before accept-
ing this conclusion. First, the delayed disbursement of shared revenues needs to be acknowledged. 
Shared revenues, in particular those from natural resources, were disbursed to regions at a very 
late stage of the fiscal year. Accordingly, a majority of regions carried over a major part of the dis-
tributed revenues into the next year. A second factor is the long-continuing tradition of late budget 
approval by local parliaments, which slows down projects'bi~ding processes, resulting in less time 
to finalize them. Even before decentralization, Indonesia's regional governments had been running 
surpluses of five to 15 percent (of total revenues) every year. Further, the FY2001 decentralization 
added another factor contributing to the slow disbursement of regional expenditures: an incessant 
war between regional officials (executives) and legislators. This problem arises from an imperfect 
definition of decision making power within regional governments. For details, see Usui and Armida 
Alisjahbana (2003). 
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than those for local governments. This implies that, at least in the aggre-
gate, local governments receive more adequate DAU allocation than 
provinces. Table 8 shows aggregate fiscal needs, fiscal capacities, fiscal 
gaps, and DAU allocations both for provinces and local governments, 
clearly showing that total DAU available to provinces is less than their total 
fiscal gaps, while local governments enjoy more than enough DAU alloca-
tions to make up their fiscal gaps. Further, the table suggests that total pool 
of DAU is more than enough at aggregate level to fulfil total fiscal gaps 
both of provinces and local governments. As mentioned, under the current 
allocation system, provinces and local governments split the total DAU 
budget 10 percent and 90 percent, respectively. Our results suggest that 
a more appropriate sharing arrangement is required, at least if the 
Government applies the current expenditure needs formulation to both 
provinces and local governments. 
Table 7 Distribution of Expenditure Needs (EN) to Fiscal Capacity (FC*) Ratios 
Baseline (FY2003) Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
(No.) (%) (No.) (%) (No.) (%) (No.) （％） 
Provinces 
EN/FC*> 1 18 60.0 18 60.0 18 60.0 18 60.0 
EN/FC*< 1 12 40.0 12 40.0 12 40.0 12 40.0 
Total 30 100.0 30 100.0 30 100.0 30 100.0 
Local Governments 
EN/FC*> 1 59 17.0 55 15.8 57 16.4 ゜0.0 EN/FC*< 1 289 83.0 293 84.2 291 83.6 348 100.0 Total 348 100.0 348 100.0 348 100.0 348 100.0 
Table 8 Aggregate Fiscal Gaps and DAU Allocations for FV2003 
(Rp. billion) Expenditure Fiscal Fiscal Gaps ## DAU FY2003 DAU/ Needs Capacities # Fiscal Gaps 
Provinces 17,392 12,691 10,259 8,851 0.863 
Local Governments 74,093 15,541 60,064 70,389 1.172 
Total 91,484 28,233 70,324 79,240 1.127 
Notes: # The Government's definition, not FC*. 
## Assuming zero fiscal gaps for regions whose fiscal capacities are larger than expenditure needs. 
Further, where the DAU allocation is non-negative we should note one 
particular implication. As mentioned, under the current system, a negative 
allocation is not allowed and the fiscal gaps in such regions are set at zero. 
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However, our simulation results show that the expenditure needs to fiscal 
capacity ratios range from 0.10 to 1.28 for provinces, and from 0.23 to 0.87 
for local governments, even under the formula based allocation. Some 
prosperous regions with broad tax bases and/or affluent natural resources 
can enjoy enough revenues without receiving any DAU. 
Figure 2 Simulation Results: Expenditure Needs (EN) to Fiscal Capacity (FC*) Ratios 
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4. Major Conclusions 
This paper reviews the evolution of Indonesia's new block transfer alloca-
tion methods in the first three years after decentralization, and assesses its 
equalization performance. The key message of this paper is that the equal-
ization function of DAU needs to be more clearly defined, and used in the 
context of clearer expenditure assignments. Other major conclusions can 
be divided into four categories: 1) conceptual and design weaknesses both 
of fiscal capacity and expenditure needs specifications in the formula; 2) 
negative impacts of hold harmless, lump-sum, and balancing factor alloca-
tions on equalization performance; 3) inappropriate sharing arrangement 
between provinces and local governments; and 4) prohibition of non-nega-
tive transfers. 
In the case of the fiscal capacity specification, the missing 25 percent of 
shared revenues from natural resources needs to be incorporated into the 
calculation. In addition, the Government needs to realize that the current 50 
percent of a region's potential own revenues does not make sense. If there 
are some weaknesses in current method of estimating potential revenues, 
it is much more desirable to utilize a region's own actual revenue with 
some reservations, to create an incentive for revenue mobilization. The ex-
penditure needs formulation contains more serious flaws: 1) specification 
of the cost index; 2) inclusion of a poverty index and its definition change; 
3) the implicit assumption that total expenditure needs are equal to the 
total of regional governments'expenses in the past; and 4) ad hoc change 
in weights of the variables employed. The cost index should be structured 
to adjust the fiscal needs differential after considering other factors, i.e., 
population, area, and poverty. The level of government with primary 
responsibility for poverty reduction activities must be clarified before the 
poverty index can be applied. If responsibility for poverty lies with regional 
governments, a poverty index can be included in the expenditure needs 
formulation. However, two other flaws can not easily be corrected. As dis-
cussed, one of the key constraints in Indonesia's decentralization is its lack 
of clear expenditure assignments to regional governments, which has trig-
gered bargaining and disputes over demarcation of authority between the 
different levels of government. Consequently, minimum service standards 
have not yet been established. Reliable expenditure needs formulation for 
DAU allocation can firstly be established with clear expenditure assign-
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ments and cost estimations, at least for some key sectors such as educa-
tion and health. However, even with clear expenditure assignments, con-
siderable time is required for costing out the minimum service standards. 
While further efforts should be made, expenditure needs assessment and 
its incorporation into the DAU allocation formula need to be set as a 
medium-or long-term policy target. 
Our analysis shows that current DAU allocations work as an equaliza-
tion grant by mitigating the unequalizing effects of sharing revenues from 
both taxes and natural resources. However, at the same time, it is clear that 
60 percent of provinces and 17 percent of local governments can not 
bridge their fiscal gaps even after DAU allocations are made. To address 
the issue, the Government needs to reduce the non-formula factor alloca-
tions (hold harmless provisions, lump-sum allocations, and balancing fac-
tor allocations). Our simulation results indicate that reduction of balancing 
factor allocations and a further shift to formula based allocation can greatly 
improve horizontal fiscal balances. Further, we note that lump-sum alloca-
tions serve as an incentive to create new regional governments, and that 
wage and salary based balancing factor allocations could discourage the 
efforts of regional governments to restructure and improve management 
efficiency because larger personnel expenses guarantee higher DAU provi-
s1ons. 
The total DAU budget, which is currently set at 25 percent of the central 
government's domestic revenues, is large enough to completely eliminate 
fiscal gaps. However, the current split between provinces (10 percent) and 
local governments (90 percent) causes a substantial shortfall in DAU for 
provinces. Our simulation results show that, even with the solely formula 
based allocation, 60 percent of provinces do not possess sufficient fiscal 
capacity to finance their expenditure needs. The Government needs to for-
mulate a more appropriate sharing arrangement after establishing clear 
expenditure assignments to both provinces and local governments. 
Further, the Government needs to realize that even formula based DAU 
allocation can not correct horizontal fiscal balances perfectly. Shared rev-
enues, particularly those derived from natural resources, have a consider-
able negative effect on equalization. This problem can only be resolved if 
negative transfers are allowed from some super rich regions which have 
affluent natural resources and broad tax bases. However, it is probably not 
possible, at least at the present time, to change the current zero weight 
-- I 
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arrangement because of the expected strong political reactions by some 
regions. 
More generally, this paper suggests there is a strong need to establish 
an independent finance or grants commission that takes a primary respon-
sibility for formulating and managing DAU allocations. In the last three 
years, the DAU allocation scheme has been undergoing almost annual 
revisions, and each of these revisions has brought new problems in its 
wake. Major weaknesses are deeply rooted in political intervention, mainly 
resulting from strong lobbying activities by some regions. Following other 
countries'experiences, the Government may need to look・for ways and 
means of setting up an independent institution. Best examples are the 
Grants Commission in Australia, the Finance Commission in India, and the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission in South Africa. 
This paper has thrown some light on DAU allocation methods. It is true 
that the present scheme has some limitations at this stage, but decentral-
ization, by its nature, is a long process, and we can expect goals to be 
achieved after a long trial and error process. We strongly recommended 
that the Government recognize the limitations of the current distribution 
procedure and move in the right direction with a carefully thought-out tran-
sition strategy. 
(Associate Professor of Development Economics, Faculty of Economics) 
Appendix Table DAU Allocation Procedures 
Total DAU amount minimum 25 percent of central net domestic revenues { → 10 percent: Provinces (DAUTP) → 90 percent: Local Governments (DAU叫
FV2001 FV2002 FY2003 
Balancing FA I SDOげ INPRES;) Wage; Wage; Provinces BFA1= • 0.8. DAUTP BFA; =• 0.3• DAUTP BFAi =• 0.3• DAUTP 
I i (SDO; + INPRES1) 
~t Wi叩名 Ii Wi⑩約
Local W⑩a Wag伶
Govts. BFA戸 1.3• SDOげ 1.l•INPRESi BFA; =• 0.5• DAU九 BFA; =• 0.45• DAUTL I i Wage; I ' Wage; 
LuPmrop-Svinucm es FA 1 1 None LSFA戸ー• 02•DAUTP I.SF. ん＝ー• 0.1•DAUか
n n 
Local DAUTL料BFAげ tFFA;) 1 1 
Govts. LSFA戸 LSF.. ん＝ー.O.l•DAUTL LSFA; = -• 0.05• DAUTL n n n 
Formula FA 
Fiscal Gap FG1 = EN; -FC; 
APBDEXPr 1 (Pop; Aw,a1 R呻叫 Cost;) APBDEXPr (o.4 Pop; A呻 Pavgap; Cost,) 
Exp. Needs 
ENi ・=n •-4 "{,Popi/n + "{,Area,jn + "{,Povhe叫i/n+江'ost;jn EN;=n• 'f Pop;Jn+0.1 'fArea, 乃+O.l名Povgap;/n+0.4'f Cosり'n
Fiscal FC;=(PAD戸PBBけBPHTBr)•_! I NRO;/GRDPi + NNRO;IGRDPi + LFi/Popi) FC; =PAD;+ PBB; + BPHTB; + PPH: げ 0.75•SDA; (FY2002) 
Capacity n 3 NROrlGRDPr NNROrlGRDPr LFr/Pi叩 T (FY2003) FC; = 0.5• PADけPBBけBPH四げPPH;+ 0.75• SDA; 
Allocation FG; 
Provinces FFA; = 0.2• DAUTP• Ii FG; 
FFA; = (DAUrx (PJ心 BFA戸 I;LSFA;)• Ii FGFG; ; 
Local FG; 
Govts. FFA; = (DAUn -I;BFA; ) • I？ FG; 
Hold None Yes Harmless 
??
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